This week’s newsletter summarizes continued discussion about adding package relay to the Bitcoin P2P network, shares a summary of the recent LN developers meeting, and describes an argument for how spenders and routing nodes on LN can optimize for both reliability and low fees in a way that benefits both groups. Also included are our regular sections with summaries of recent releases and release candidates plus notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.


  • Continued package relay BIP discussion: a recent draft BIP for package relay (see Newsletter #201) has received additional comments in the past several weeks:

    • Policy limits: Anthony Towns asked if the negotiation between two peers to support package relay should include information about each peer’s package maximum size and depth limits, otherwise nodes with non-default settings could receive repeated notifications about packages they did not want, wasting bandwidth. BIP author Gloria Zhao suggests using the first version of the package relay protocol should imply a maximum package size of 25 transactions and 101,000 vbytes.

    • Package graph announcement only: Eric Voskuil recommends that a peer who learns about a high-feerate descendant of a low-feerate ancestor should simply inform its peers of the relationships between those two transactions, called the package graph. A receiving peer can then request any transactions it doesn’t have. In a separate part of the thread, Towns notes that a graph can’t be validated until all transactions have been received, so care must be taken to ensure a peer can’t lie about a graph in order to prevent a transaction from being relayed by other peers.

    • Using short ids: several developers suggested using BIP152-style short identifiers (ids). Zhao explained that short ids make sense for block relay where nodes first validate a new block’s proof of work (which is expensive to create), so it would be expensive for an attacker to abuse the mechanism to waste node resources. But, for relay of data that is cheap to create, short ids can be abused over and over again to potentially create a denial-of-service attack.

    • Non-standard parents: Suhas Daftuar describes a scenario where a node implementing package relay can end up repeatedly requesting the same data. This would be especially likely to happen when relay policy differs between older and newer nodes, such as after a soft fork is activated.

    • Challenges of a block hash beacon: Daftuar also notes that one feature of the proposal may cause problems for other software. The current draft BIP includes the node’s current hash of the latest block on the block chain in each package annoucement. This allows the receiving peer to ignore a package if it’s from an earlier block (or alternative chain), in which case the package may not work with the receiving peer’s current mempool. However, Daftuar notes that there’s probably a lot of software that sends transactions—and which may eventually like to send packages—which doesn’t keep track of the current chain tip hash.

  • Summary of LN developer meeting: Olaoluwa Osuntokun provided a detailed summary of the LN dev meeting in Oakland last week. Topics covered included:

    • Taproot-based LN channels: participants discussed the first steps for moving LN to full use of taproot’s features. Later steps will likely include support for PTLCs (see also Newsletter #164).

    • Tapscript and MuSig2: as part of the switch to taproot-based channels, there is a need to convert existing scripts to tapscript in the way that makes the most efficient use of block space. There’s also a desire to use MuSig2 for creating signatures in all the places where both signers are expected to act cooperatively. Both of these need to be implemented and tested to ensure they work as expected.

    • Recursive MuSig2: a simple implementation of MuSig2 can allow Alice and Bob to jointly create a single signature. Recursive MuSig2 would allow, for example, Alice to create her part of the signature using both her hot wallet and a hardware signing device without Bob performing any special steps or even knowing that Alice was signing with more than one key. It was discussed how to design LN’s use of MuSig2 to ensure recursive MuSig2 was available. Also the security of recursive MuSig2 was discussed.

    • Extension BOLTs: an alternate way to specify changes to the LN protocol specification. Currently, changes to the specification are made as a patch (diff) to the existing specification. However, some developers prefer the method used for BIPs where major changes to the protocol are specified in one or more documents specific to those changes. Those developers believe separate documents are easier to write and read, and so may simplify and speed up development.

    • Gossip network updates: the meeting continued the existing discussion about updating LN gossip (see Newsletter #188), which is used to relay announcements about new and updated channels. According to the summary, participants would prefer to focus in the short term on a small upgrade to the protocol to support MuSig2-based taproot channels and also upgrade the protocol to fully use TLV semantics.

    • Minisketch-based efficient gossip: as mentioned in Newsletter #198, research is continuing into using minisketch to reduce the amount of bandwidth used to sync LN gossip between nodes, which may also allow for reducing the minimum allowed time between updates.

    • Onion message DoS: several LN implementations already support onion messages as both an alternative to using keysend payments for messaging and as a communications layer for the proposed BOLT12 offers protocol. However, as mentioned in Newsletter #190, some developers remain concerned that onion messages may be vulnerable to several different types of denial-of-service attacks. Several methods of preventing DoS attacks were discussed.

    • Blinded paths: a technique proposed several years ago (see Newsletter #85) and now used for onion messages is also seeing experimentation for use with regular payments to allow users to receive payments without disclosing the identity of their LN node. A challenge faced by this approach is that it requires communicating more routing information, so larger invoices are required. That may make effective implementation of blinded paths dependent on newer invoice-management protocols such as BOLT12 offers or LNURL. Several other concerns were also discussed.

    • Probing and balance sharing: using a variety of techniques, it’s possible for a node to probe the balance of channels on the network. Such probing is effectively free for the node performing the probing but it can cause problems for regular users of the network in addition to reducing privacy. Mitigations for the separate channel jamming attack may help limit probing, but it remains a concern at the present time, so participants discussed some quick changes to node settings that could make probing more difficult.

      Additionally, one previously-discussed thought experiment is to take the information that a probing node would learn and have nodes share it freely without requiring any probing. If that was done by every node, the bandwidth requirements and loss of privacy would negate LN’s key advantages—but it would also make routing payments much more efficient. Nobody is proposing that idea, but a previous research topic was discussed of each node sharing with only its direct channel peers some of the information they could learn through probing. It was claimed that this could significantly improve payment routing success, such as by supplementing Just-In-Time (JIT) channel rebalancing.

    • Trampoline routing and mobile payments: trampoline routing allows a spender to outsource pathfinding to another node on the network, optionally in a way that maintains LN’s usual privacy of preventing any intermediate node from learning the network identity of either the spender or receiver. This outsourcing is especially useful for mobile LN clients who aren’t attempting to route other payments for other nodes. As mentioned in the meeting summary, trampoline payments can be combined with first hop payment holds (see Newsletter #171) where a payment is held by a spender’s direct channel peer until the receiving node is next online, allowing an often-offline mobile node to reliably receive payments from other often-offline mobile nodes.

    • LNURL plus BOLT12: the LNURL protocol allows a node to request a BOLT11 invoice from a webserver; the BOLT12 offers protocol allows requesting an invoice from a node on the network. Among other aspects of these protocols, participants discussed how the two protocols could be made compatible with each other so that nodes could use either or both of them.

  • Using routing fees to signal liquidity: developer ZmnSCPxj posted to the Lightning-Dev mailing list an argument for how optimally cheap and reliable payments could be obtained through game theoretic behavior between spenders and routing nodes:

    • Spenders should choose paths that charge less in routing fees.

    • Routing nodes should charge more to use a channel as its capacity decreases. E.g., if most of the balance in a channel is owned by Alice, she can reliably forward payments to Bob and so she shouldn’t charge much; but, as more balance is forwarded towards Bob, Alice’s ability to forward additional payments decreases, so she should charge higher fees.

    ZmnSCPxj frames this argument using supply and demand economics—as demand increases for routing payments in one direction, e.g. from Alice to Bob, the supply of additional satoshis which can be routed in that direction naturally decreases. Raising the price of routing fees can lower demand until the supply again increases through people routing payments in the other direction (e.g. from Bob to Alice).

    Spenders are already naturally incentivized to use lower fees (all other things being equal), so ZmnSCPxj argues that any routing node that adopts the strategy of high-supply/low-fees and low-supply/high-fees will automatically keep its channels reasonably balanced and so be able to process a greater number of successful payments over its channel lifetime than nodes which do not adopt this strategy. Because routing nodes only get paid for successful payment routing, this could make nodes adopting the high-low/low-high strategy more competitive.

    A key benefit of this approach is that it makes pathfinding for spenders very easy—they just attempt paying along the cheapest routes, within capacity limits. A drawback is that each change to a routing nodes fee under the high-low/low-high strategy implies a corresponding change to channel’s balance, disclosing information about the size of payments which may have flowed across that channel recently. For example, if the channels Alice→Bob, Bob→Carol, and Carol→Dan have all recently decreased in capacity by about 1 BTC, it’s reasonable to infer that either Alice or one of her channel partners routed a 1 BTC payment to Dan or one of his channel partners. An additional problem is that each change to a channel’s fees needs to be gossiped across the network, which increases bandwidth requirements and which can also cause spurious routing failures (e.g. because spender Sally hasn’t heard about Alice’s new higher feerate and so attempts routing a payment across the channel from Alice to Bob using an older and lower fee that Alice rejects).

    ZmnSCPxj addresses these issues by describing several mitigation strategies, some of which can be implemented by nodes now with no changes to the LN protocol, and some of which would require seemingly minor updates to the LN gossip protocol. The mitigation strategies described have not received any discussion on the mailing list as of this writing, although they appear to be mentioned in Olaoluwa Osuntokun’s summary of the LN developer’s meeting (as further summarized by Optech in the previous bullet point).

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test release candidates.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable changes this week in Bitcoin Core, Core Lightning, Eclair, LDK, LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet Interface (HWI), Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay Server, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs), and Lightning BOLTs.

  • Bitcoin Core #24171 amends the Initial Block Download (IBD) behavior to request block data from inbound peers if no outbound peer is serving block data. Previously, a node would only request data from inbound peers if it did not have any outbound peers at all. This behavior could cause a stall if a node had only outbound peers that did not serve blocks. Nodes still request data only from outbound peers as soon as any outbound peer serves blocks.

  • BDK #593 begins using rust bitcoin 0.28, which includes support for taproot and taproot output script descriptors.