This week’s newsletter describes a proposed option for Bitcoin Core that would make it easier to enable transaction replacement even for transactions that don’t opt-in to BIP125, links to information about the Hertzbleed sidechannel vulnerability, summarizes the conclusion of a discussion about time stamping system design, and examines a new anti-sybil protocol that uses Bitcoin UTXOs. Also included are our regular sections with descriptions of interesting new features in Bitcoin clients and services, announcements of new releases and release candidates, and summaries of notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.


  • Full replace by fee: two pull requests have been opened to add support to Bitcoin Core for full Replace By Fee (RBF) as an option that is off by default. If enabled, any unconfirmed transaction in that node’s mempool could be replaced by an alternative version of that transaction which pays a higher feerate (among other rules).

    Currently Bitcoin Core only allows RBF if the version of the transaction to be replaced has a signaling bit enabled, as defined in BIP125. This creates a challenge for multiparty contract protocols, such as LN and DLCs, where it is sometimes possible for one party to remove the BIP125 signal from a transaction in order to prevent other parties from using transaction replacement. This can lead to delays, and in the worst case it may lead to a loss of funds in protocols that depend on timely confirmation (such as for HTLCs).

    One of the PRs quickly received significant developer support. Because it only adds the ability to enable full RBF—but does not enable it by default—it does not change Bitcoin Core’s current default behavior. In the long-term, some developers will likely advocate for enabling full RBF by default, so a thread was started on the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list this week to give developers of services, applications, and alternative full node software a chance to argue against the direction of providing a full RBF option and perhaps eventually enabling it by default.

  • Hertzbleed: a recently disclosed security vulnerability affecting many (perhaps all) popular laptop, desktop, and server CPU processors may allow attackers to discover private keys when those keys are being used to create signatures for Bitcoin transactions (or perform other similar operations). The noteworthy aspect of this attack is that it may affect signature generation code that was specifically written to always use the same type and number of CPU operations in order to prevent leaking information to attackers.

    Exploiting the vulnerability would require an attacker to measure either the power consumption of a CPU chip or measure the duration of parts of the signing operation. Ideally for an attacker, they would be able to take measurements while a user creates many signatures using the same private key. As such, the vulnerability is more likely to affect frequently used hot wallets, such as those used by hosted services and LN routing nodes, and cases of address reuse. Mostly or entirely offline wallets that are used in secure environments would be much more resistant to attacks.

    As of this writing, it isn’t entirely clear how significant the vulnerability is for Bitcoin users. Many wallets today, including several popular hardware signing devices, are already known to use signature generation code that’s vulnerable to power and timing analysis, so perhaps nothing is changed for those users. For users of more secure code, it is possible that developers will implement additional protections. If you have any questions or concerns about the software you use, please contact its developers through the appropriate support channels (such as Bitcoin Stack Exchange for many free and open source software Bitcoin projects).

  • Timestamping design: A protracted debate on the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list about the design of the Bitcoin-based Open Timestamps (OTS) system seemed to conclude this week. The source of the debate appears to have been the existence of two different designs for time stamping systems:

    • Time Stamped Proofs of Existence (TSPoE): a Bitcoin transaction commits to a hash digest which commits to a document. When the transaction is confirmed in a block, it’s possible for the creator of the commitment to prove to third parties that the document existed at the time the block was created. Notably, each time stamping transaction can be completely independent from other time stamping transactions, meaning it’s possible to timestamp the same document multiple times with no connection between the time stamps.

    • Event Ordering (EO): a series of transactions all related to each other in a specified manner each commits to documents in a way that allows any user of the system to see all the commitments. For any document that is timestamped two or more times under this system, it is possible to determine when it was first timestamped.

    The TSPoE system as implemented by OTS is essentially perfectly efficient. It uses the same amount of global storage space to time stamp an unlimited number of documents, with each person who requests a timestamp being responsible for storing their time stamp proofs. This system also has the advantage of being simple both in concept and implementation.

    The EO system requires all full participants store the commitments to every document. This can be much less efficient and adds complexity. The tradeoff is that it does allow participants to verify when a document was first published to the system.

    The discussion did not lead to any announced changes in any system or proposal, such as Open Timestamps or transaction sponsorship (the original topic of discussion, see Newsletter #116). It did seem to surprise several discussion participants that they could each have different concepts of what “time stamping” implied.

  • New RIDDLE anti-sybil method: Adam “Waxwing” Gibson posted to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list a proposal for an anti-sybil mechanism that uses the Bitcoin UTXO set and which can provide reasonably good privacy. A user can generate a list of UTXOs where one of the UTXOs belongs to the user and the rest belong to other users. The user then creates a signature which provably came from an owner of one of the listed UTXOs but does not reveal which owner created it.

    A malicious user could generate many such proofs but only a finite number of them before they exhaust the pool of options, restricting their ability to overconsume scarce network resources. The malicious user could also use a UTXO for as long as possible and then spend it to obtain a new UTXO, but this would incur a transaction fee. That costliness also deters abuse. Services could further limit sybils by limiting which UTXOs the user could select. For example, a service might only accept a signature over UTXOs that are 1 BTC in value and which have remained unspent for a year.

    Gibson proposes that membership proofs could come in two forms: a global proof and a local proofs. Global proofs would be shared between verifiers so that, under ideal conditions, a user could only create one proof per UTXO in the global context. For example, the user would only be able to sign up for one account for each year-old UTXO worth 1 BTC.

    Local contexts would be specific to a single verifier (or a group of associated verifiers, such as on a decentralized exchange). For example, a user could use a UTXO to access APIs on service A and then reuse the same UTXO for service B.

    Additionally, high value UTXOs could be treated as multiple UTXOs of a lower value, so a 10 BTC UTXO could allow a user to sign up for 10 different accounts at different services each requiring 1 BTC of capital in the global context.

    Although the RIDDLE protocol does provide privacy advantages over other anti-sybil mechanisms, Gibson does warn that information from use of the system can be combined with other available information to potentially reduce the user’s privacy. He writes, “there is no possibility that this kind of system can provide iron-clad privacy guarantees. If protecting the location of the real signing utxo is a matter of life and death, on no account use a system like this!”

    On the Lightning-Dev mailing list, developer ZmnSCPxj suggested RIDDLE might be an option for separating LN’s anti-sybil mechanism from UTXO-based channel identifiers which, in the era of taproot and signature aggregation, unnecessarily disclose which onchain transactions are LN channel opens and mutual closes.

Changes to services and client software

In this monthly feature, we highlight interesting updates to Bitcoin wallets and services.

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test release candidates.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable changes this week in Bitcoin Core, Core Lightning, Eclair, LDK, LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet Interface (HWI), Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay Server, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs), and Lightning BOLTs.

  • Bitcoin Core GUI #602 writes settings changed in the GUI to a file also loaded by the headless daemon (bitcoind) so the changed settings are used no matter how the user starts Bitcoin Core.

  • Eclair #2224 adds support Short Channel Identifier (scid) aliases and the zero-conf channel type. The scid aliases can improve privacy and also make it possible for nodes to easily refer to a channel before it has been sufficiently confirmed. Zero-conf channels allow two nodes to agree to use a channel for routing payments before it has been sufficiently confirmed, which can be secure under certain restraints.

  • HWI #611 adds single-sig support for bech32m addresses with the BitBox02 hardware signing device.