Mark “Murch” Erhardt and Mike Schmidt are joined by Matt Corallo, Brandon Black, Gregory Sanders, and James O’Beirne to discuss Newsletter #266.

The Bitcoin Optech Podcast and transcription content is licensed Creative Commons CC BY-SA 2.0


  • Covenant mashup using `TXHASH` and `CSFS` (1:30)

Selected Q&A from Bitcoin Stack Exchange

  • Is there an economic incentive to switch from P2WPKH to P2TR? (34:44)

  • What is the BIP324 encrypted packet structure? (37:31)

  • What is the false positive rate for compact block filters? (39:23)

  • What opcodes are part of the MATT proposal? (40:27)

  • Is there a well defined last Bitcoin block? (41:40)

  • Why are miners setting the locktime in coinbase transactions? (46:10)

  • Why doesn't Bitcoin Core use auxiliary randomness when performing Schnorr signatures? (47:40)

Releases and release candidates

Notable code and documentation changes


Mike Schmidt: Welcome everyone to Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #266 Recap on Twitter Spaces. It’s Thursday, August 31, and today we’ll be talking about the disclosure of a Lightning Network vulnerability, covenant mashups with TXHASH and CHECKSIGFROMSTACK, and we’ll be covering our monthly highlights of Bitcoin Stack Exchange Q&A, simple taproot channels, and more, with our special guests Matt Corallo, Brandon Black, and hopefully Greg Sanders. So, let’s do some introductions and then we’ll jump into it. I’m Mike Schmidt, contributor at Bitcoin Optech and also Executive Director at Brink, funding Bitcoin open-source developers. Murch?

Mark Erhardt: Hi, I’m Murch, I work at Chaincode Labs on Bitcoin Core, Bitcoin Stack Exchange and other Bitcoin projects.

Mike Schmidt: Matt?

Matt Corallo: Hey, I’m Matt, I work at Spiral on the LDK team.

Mike Schmidt: Brandon?

Brandon Black: Hi, I’m Brandon and I really like covenants!

Mike Schmidt: All right, well I’ve shared a few tweets in the Space for folks to follow along. You can also pull up the newsletter at First item, actually, Brandon, I think you need to jump off. So did you want to talk about covenants first?

Brandon Black: That’d be great, yeah.

Covenant mashup using TXHASH and CSFS

Mike Schmidt: Okay, well, so we’ll go a little bit out of order this week in the interest of Brandon’s schedule. So we’ll actually be talking about Covenant mashups using OP_TXHASH and OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK (CSFS), which is a proposal that’s an alternative to BIP119, which is OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY (CTV), and BIP118, SIGHASH-ANYPREVOUT (APO), which provides functionality of both proposals with no additional overhead. Brandon, maybe you want to elaborate a bit on that, and we can talk about some of the origins of this proposal. I think Russell O’Connor had proposed something similar in January 2022, and I know you have some goals of sort of elevating the discussion around covenants. So, maybe you can take this wherever you’d like to get started.

Brandon Black: Yeah, thank you so much. I want to just make clear up front, my proposal is not serious for full inclusion. Really, the focus that I have is bringing together the understanding of covenants. There seems to be a lot of confusion in the Bitcoin space between what you can do with CTV and what you can do with APO and where there is and is not overlap. And as I was studying them over the recent months, I realized there’s a lot of overlap, but also some specific areas where they can’t do each other’s jobs well. And so this proposal is partially showing those similarities and differences, and that’s why I added the table at the bottom of my gist there that shows what is and is not included in the different hash methods that APO and CTV use respectively, and then how that can be included potentially in one proposal that could offer the features of both.

The other thing that I wanted to mention right up front is that this way of doing covenants is about as efficient as APO or CTV if everything’s in taproot, but bare CTV using a plain scriptPubKey is much more efficient for that specific use case. So, if we find as a community that the many uses of CTV are going to be frequent and are very valuable, we should just do CTV. It’s much more efficient for those specific bare CTV use cases. On the other hand, if the most important thing we want is LN-symmetry and OP_VAULT, then something like my proposal offers both of those with very little downside. Yeah, so that’s kind of the high-level stuff that’s worth mentioning.

My specific proposal includes CSFS, which also enables some other things that I haven’t even explored yet. I think James O’Beirne mentioned that it enables key delegation, but it also potentially enables templates delegation, where your script includes a CSFS on a non-specific template, but then you check that with a CTV, or things like that. So, there’s this delegation aspect you can do with CSFS that I haven’t really fully explored yet. I should probably talk more about what exactly I proposed, but I’m going to pause there for a second.

Mike Schmidt: I think it’s okay to continue, maybe discuss more about what you’re proposing here?

Mark Erhardt: Okay, yeah. So, Russell O’Connor originally proposed a TXHASH way of doing covenants. His proposal was more a flags-based approach, where you would have a bunch of specific chunks of the transaction, and you would have a flag, “I want to include this. I don’t want to include that”, a flag field to include various pieces of a transaction in a hash that would then get put on the stack and could be used for later processing. So, if you made a CTV-like hash using TXHASH, then you could validate that using OP_EQUALVERIFY, so you put the TXHASH with the appropriate flags, you put the template hash you want to check against in OP_EQUALVERIFY, and you can basically get the functionality of CTV with that. If you then include CSFS, you can use an TXHASH with flags to make an APO-like hash to verify that. So that’s kind of the original proposal.

When he proposed that, there started to be kind of a lot of discussion about exactly what flags there should and should not be. And if you read through Jeremy Rubin’s BIP119, he had a huge exposition, a really valuable reasoning behind why each bit of the template is included, or not included in some cases. And it’s hard to capture those details that Jeremy Rubin thoughtfully put into the CTV BIP in a flags-based TXHASH; and then also, there’s just a lot of space for bike-shedding of what could and could not be included and the quadratic hashing potentially of certain ways flags could be activated. For those not aware, quadratic hashing is where if you have several inputs all using a similar opcode and they require slightly different hashes of each other, you can end up potentially hashing many, many megabytes of data in order to validate one transaction. Anyway, so yeah, it’s hard to get a TXHASH opcode that avoids some of these pitfalls.

I think at the time, even back in 2021 or 2022, folks proposed a limited version of TXHASH that was more, “Here’s these specific ways to hash the transaction”. And I kind of extended from that and said, “Let’s specify some of those specific ways to hash, make them represent roughly APO and CTV, get pretty close to those ways of hashing, and then that gives us the functionality we want while avoiding the pitfalls of quadratic hashing, because we don’t have all these specific selectable fields”. And so that’s kind of what I did.

Mike Schmidt: Greg Sanders has joined us. Greg, obviously, you’re involved or familiar with a lot of these covenant discussions and some of the tech around there. Do you have questions or comments on what Brandon’s proposed/the awareness of all this covenant chat and comparisons?

Greg Sanders: Yeah, I mean, I’ve been talking to him offline about this. As he says, it’s kind of a high-level proposal, so a lot of things would change in the event of people going forward with it. I think my high-level comment is just, it’s going to be hard to predict what fields and which iterations are kind of what people actually need and want. I think the real trick with all these schemes is being able to pick what’s actually useful. So, I mean I’ll see the floor and let maybe Matt speak up.

Matt Corallo: Well, predict what’s useful and also be flexible, because part of the problem with a lot of the covenant stuff is there’s a lot of excitement around various wallet designs, where you have kind of this pseudo-custodial model. I know AJ has written about this, I’ve spoken about this, James O’Beirne recently wrote about this, these things in the Ark direction, but ideally with better scalability properties. And there’s a lot of, I think, understanding that these designs probably need some kind of covenant system to build, but these designs also aren’t fleshed out in full, there’s just kind of rough excitement in the direction and not necessarily specific designs. And so, that makes it doubly hard when there’s like, “Well, there’s some stuff we know we want to build, and then there’s probably some other stuff that we want to build that we don’t know yet”. Yeah, it makes it very hard to predict what kind of hashes we’re going to find!

Greg Sanders: Yeah, and even in the non-custodial sense, CoinPool designs are very not fleshed out yet. There have been some designs kind of sketched out, but I think we don’t know what a good CoinPool solution would look like, in many ways.

Matt Corallo: Right, exactly.

Brandon Black: Yeah, I totally agree. It’s one of the things that’s been challenging in thinking about and writing about this. There’s all of these ideas floating around about what you can do with covenants, but since they don’t have detailed specs or detailed especially implementations of how they’re going to use a covenant, you ask, “Okay, well what exactly do you need and not need for what you want to do?” And the answer is, “I mean, it’s like CTV or it’s like APO”, but that often doesn’t actually answer the question.

Mike Schmidt: I’ll plug one of the conversations that some of us at Brink have had with James O’Beirne recently. We put that out as a video chat, and we had folks like Christian Decker representing APO, and James talking about some of his vault work. So if you’re curious about that, go to, and there’ll be a link to a YouTube video there if you want to hear some of that discussion. Murch, do you have questions or comments on this topic?

Mark Erhardt: No, I don’t, but I see James appeared in our Optech Recap, so maybe he has an idea of what he wants to say about this proposal from Brandon.

Mike Schmidt: James, I sent you a speaker invite if you’re on mobile and able to chat with us.

Greg Sanders: Might not be on mobile.

Mike Schmidt: Perhaps not.

Greg Sanders: No ones figured out about how to do voice on web browser, right? It’s impossible, I think.

Mike Schmidt: Not even, yeah, Elon can’t even.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, we hear you.

James O’Beirne: Oh, wow, that’s surprising. I’m on Linux and a web browser and you can hear me. That’s amazing.

Mike Schmidt: Hey, James.

James O’Beirne: Yeah, hey, I didn’t expect to be able to make this, but it’s great to be here. Yeah, I like Brandon’s proposal. I made a few comments in the Delving Bitcoin Forum. And I think the rough gist is that I think that the most expeditious path to getting CTV and APO, in my opinion, is basically just to use the existing proposals, because while I think Brandon’s proposal is very novel in that it kind of unites the form that both of them take, and he did a really fantastic job of breaking down their usages in terms of the virtual byte sizes of the resulting scripts, but I think I can’t really get my head around what the killer use case for CSFS is, and it seems like the big benefit of the proposal is that it formulates CTV and APO in such a way that their use looks very similar and is enabled by CSFS.

But I think there are marginal space efficiency losses, at least in the CTV case. And I sort of don’t have a good intuition, I guess I should say, for why we want to shoehorn all this into CSFS.

Brandon Black: Yeah, I mean to be clear, when you’re using my proposal to emulate CTV, there is no CSFS. The CSFS is to enable signed delegation to a hash that is different from a signature hash (sighash). And I think one of the reasons for me going in this direction, I think many of you have seen probably, I originally made a PR against the APO BIP, because APO as it stands has this slightly weird behavior that APO implies anyone can pay, and that actually prevents a CTV-like covenant from being enabled by APO.

So, I originally went down that path, and then as I read more into APO, I have this feeling that, and I hate to use the word “feeling” in a technical discussion, but there it is, I have this feeling that APO is kind of a shoehorn itself, because removing the commitment to the specific outpoint being spent was a big enough change that various folks, when APL was being designed, chose to use a new key type to enable APO. Once you go into a new key type, you might as well explore using a different opcode. I propose using CSFS as that new opcode, because it does have kind of a different behavior when we’re not committing to the outpoint of what’s being sent. So, that’s kind of how I got to this, as opposed to using the existing CHECKSIG operations to enable APO.

James O’Beirne: Yeah, that’s that makes a lot of sense, Brandon. And can you talk about maybe why you think having a specific pubkey type for APO is worth avoiding?

Brandon Black: I guess my thought there is, it’s not a different key type, it’s a different hash type, and I think that our designs should communicate what they’re doing better than that.

James O’Beirne: Yeah, that makes sense to me. I never really had a good intuition for why we wanted to be so cautious about tagging APO-enabled pubkeys in that way, but maybe somebody else.

Greg Sanders: If I remember correctly, reading the spec, any undefined sighash arrangement for taproot results in a sighash fail, like a failure, right? So one thing is, you don’t really have an upgrade. I guess even in legacy, unknown configurations were just kind of ignored, sort of. So it wasn’t really – go ahead, Murch.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think all sighash flags are defined and all of them do something, and it has to be that way, otherwise they would be anyonecanspend.

Greg Sanders: Yeah. So I’m just recapping, kind of, there’s no upgrade hook in that direction. So, if you want to change sighash flag hooks, you need to find some other way to do it, right? So, I don’t know if it’s really that much of a shoehorn versus a reality of upgrade hooks.

James O’Beirne: Oh, okay, yeah, so that’s just an incidental property.

Greg Sanders: Yeah, I had thought about – oh, am I losing connection here, or is it you, James?

Mark Erhardt: I think it was James.

Greg Sanders: Yeah, I think it’s not necessarily obvious unless you actually think through the upgrade hooks, but it wouldn’t be possible to do that, as Murch said.

Mark Erhardt: All right. Does anything else need to be said about this topic at the moment?

James O’Beirne: Again, great job –

Mark Erhardt: Is James speaking or not, because I don’t hear him?

James O’Beirne: Yeah, I started to speak, sorry. Yeah, I just want to say again, great job to Brandon for the novel proposal and spurring this really good discussion. I mean, this may be the route that we end up going on.

Mike Schmidt: It does seem like there is a lot more discussion to be had, and it seems also that the Delving Bitcoin website is also becoming a place where some of these discussions are being had. James, I know you had some opinions on the appropriate forums for some of these discussions, and maybe you want to, for the audience, summarize what is Delving Bitcoin and why that might be a good place to have these kind of discussions versus Twitter.

James O’Beirne: Yeah, so I think you’ve got two ends of the spectrum right now. On one far side, you’ve got the mailing list, which I think people are a little skittish about posting to and take very seriously and can be intimidated about contributing to; and then on the other side, you’ve got Twitter, which is like a total free-for-all with a really weird set of properties as a medium that isn’t really searchable. And I mean, at this point, you can’t even get a stream of people who you follow reliably. So, I think de facto a lot of discussion happens on Twitter just because everybody’s there. But I’d like to see something that both facilitates free and open discussion, but actually supports long-form technical discussion.

Stack Overflow is kind of close, but this discourse platform that AJ and Ruben Somsen set up, Delving Bitcoin, seems to really nail it from a kind of medium standpoint. So, I’ve just decided to start posting stuff there because I think it’s a better way of talking about this stuff.

Matt Corallo: I mean, this is the classic – Murch has his hand up, I’ll let him speak first.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I was just going to say, my problem with the mailing list is actually exactly opposite of what you described. I feel that the quality of the mailing list has become so much more noise that it just, I don’t really read it anymore because it’s usually not useful to me. And I think that’s one of the reasons why a lot of people just don’t post there anymore. And also Stack Exchange is definitely not for discussion, it’s just really more for answering a question. So yeah, I think that another platform like Delving Bitcoin is a better fit. So, Matt?

Matt Corallo: Right, I was just going to point out this is kind of the classic story as old as time, how communities move, right? First, a new forum exists. There’s people who are really into it and really deep and smart on a topic, have spent a lot of time thinking about the topic, use this forum. After a while, various other folks join who don’t spend as much time thinking about the topic, have less informed reviews on it. This creates more noise, eventually the folks who are really deep on a topic get frustrated, leave. This is what happened to Bitcoin Talk, they left to the mailing list, and then the mailing list is now kind of filled with less informed takes, let’s say. As a result, a lot of the technical voices who do work full-time on Bitcoin have stopped posting, which has made the signal-to-noise ratio even worse, as Murch said.

Now, it seems like someone has created a new forum, which will initially have great signal-to-noise ratio, and people should use it, and then eventually it will probably also die. But this is just kind of how internet communities have moved from forum to forum forever.

James O’Beirne: Yeah, I just think there’s little niceties about Delving, like it’ll actually do syntax highlighting and you can throw mermaid.js diagrams in there and little stuff like that. But I mean, it’s just it’s a platform that’s actually suited for long-form discussion, whereas Twitter is basically just suited for shitposting. So, I don’t know if we can expect –

Matt Corallo: I was comparing it more to Bitcoin Talk and then the mailing list, not Twitter.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think that Discourse is just a way more modern and better forum software than whatever, what is it, BB Forum, or whatever that Bitcoin Talk is running on, so I think that will also help. Anyway, let’s wrap that up, but also I need a Delving account!

Mike Schmidt: The other news item from this week was the disclosure of LN vulnerability related to fake funding. And I guess before we jump into that – oh, Brandon just jumped off. I was going to thank him for joining, I know he couldn’t stay. We have a Lightning expert as part of our guest attendees. So Matt, do you want to discuss this vulnerability, maybe summarize it? It seems fairly straightforward, but maybe you can give us your summary of it.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, there’s not a hell of a lot to it. Basically, every major Lightning implementation, all four of them, didn’t do much to limit the resources. When someone opens a channel to you, you do have to store a little bit of information. There’s some discussion about maybe making this deterministic derivations, but in the obvious implementation, when someone opens a channel to you, you have to store, “Hey, here’s the channel, and here’s the funding outpoint, here’s my initial force closing transactions”, so if I want to force close the transaction for whatever reason, even though I don’t have any money in it, I do that. And so, every major Lightning implementation stores some data for it, not too much. So, someone can just connect to you and there was no rate limiting or no bounding and someone could connect to you, tell you that they’re going to open a million channels to you, and then just not open them because they don’t actually have the Bitcoin for it. Every major Lightning implementation would just keep writing more and more crap to its database and eventually you could make a Lightning implementation get pretty slow as a result.

So, how it actually ended up resulting on various Lightning implementations was a little different, depending on the architecture and the database back then, and which part of the system ended up getting slow first, etc. But the end result was the same for all of them, and the attack was the same for all of them.

Mike Schmidt: There was, in the writeup that Matt Morehouse posted, he put a section on lessons, and he says in that post, “Use watchtowers because they provide cheap insurance”. He also mentioned multiple processes. For example, CLN has separate daemon processes for different pieces, one for peer connections that became locked under this attack, but the lightningd process continued to watch the blockchain, which was unaffected. Matt, do you agree with these lessons learned, or is it just simply putting in some rate limiting, which it looks like a lot of the implementations did?

Matt Corallo: That’s a part of it. Watchtowers are great. The watchtowers that exist don’t enforce HTLCs, they only enforce the, let’s call it, main unencumbered balance of a Lightning channel. So, they do have substantial drawbacks in terms of how effectively they can get you all of your money back. There’s various other designs for watchtowers. That’s useful for various attacks we’ve seen on Lightning. Multiple processes is great, right up until someone actually opens enough channel that your whole system starts booming and killing processes. That’s kind of more of a side effect of which things started failing first and less a side effect of, this is the general purpose mitigation for all issues. Multiple processes is good for other reasons, and I know CLN and Eclair and LDK all support multiple processes in various forms.

But yeah, I mean at the end of the day, there was already an open issue for this on LDK, and I think also Eclair, by the time it was reported. In LDK, we’d noted this a while back. It wasn’t as big an issue for a lot of the LDK deployments because either they only accept channels from trusted peers or they’re a mobile phone and only connect to an LSP. So, it was less of a concern for us kind of immediately unless we didn’t rush to fix it. And then Matt came around and pointed out, “Yeah, this is probably worth fixing”. If anyone does run public nodes or nodes that accept channels from anyone using LDK, this is kind of a pretty major issue. So we did, we fixed it pretty quickly after that.

I mean, this is one of those things where it wasn’t completely unknown. I guess it wasn’t necessarily known to LND, or CLN, or at least there weren’t any public issues on it. They might have known it in some way. And yeah, I mean I think this is just kind of Lightning software slowly maturing. The Lightning space is still kind of new, there’s a lot of code that’s been written, and just not as much time spent on – it just takes time for code to mature to that level, and that’s done great work fuzzing on CLN and LND, I believe. The LDK project also has a bunch of fuzzers for various state machines. And yeah, just finding these kinds of issues and various issues that you’re going to find with these kinds of security analysis just takes time. Similarly, Lightning still really needs package relay or there’s various other attacks you can do against Lightning nodes.

So, I would just say it’s still early in Lightning in terms of the security models and the security and reliability that Lightning is able to provide today. We’re working on it, a lot of progress is being made, and a lot of credit to folks like Matt who’ve done good security review of various Lightning implementations and found issues and reported them. But yeah, just takes time.

Mike Schmidt: Matt noted in his writeup, “The fact that this DoS vector went unnoticed since the beginning of the Lightning Network should make everyone a little scared. If a newcomer like me could discover this vulnerability in a couple of months, there are probably many other vulnerabilities in the Lightning Network waiting to be found and exploited”. Matt, what’s your take on that?

Matt Corallo: I mean, I think he’s largely spot on. Again, I think that both LDK, and I need to reread his disclosure email, but I thought he said Eclair as well, were aware of the issue, had open issues to track it and resolve it hopefully soon, although it had slipped one milestone on the LDK side. But he’s absolutely right. Again, Lightning is still early and there will be these kinds of issues. And people who have really large material volumes of money in their Lightning node should consider who they open a channel with. That has been true since the beginning of Lightning and that hasn’t changed. And again, there are known attacks in mempool and relay policy and stuff that people are working on fixing, there will be more unknown issues like this, DoS issues. Watchtowers are a good solution for some of those.

Other things, if your watchtower is running the same code as your main Lightning node, it’s only going to do so much. We’ve seen some issues with BTCD that caused issues for LND-based watchtowers as well. So yeah, expect more things to come. And if you are looking at storing really material volumes of money in Lightning, you probably need to build something custom and not just run LND or CLN straight up with no consideration given to multiple data center storage and multiple data center, different software watchtowers, and all kinds of more enterprise considerations, that just I think a lot of people running Lightning today haven’t given a hell of a lot of thought to.

Mike Schmidt: Murch or Greg, do you guys have any comments on this item?

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, you go Greg.

Greg Sanders: Everything you said was very reasonable.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think that people sometimes get a little frustrated that Lightning has been around since 2015 and we’ve had it on mainnet, but it’s really still a process in flight. It’s not done, it’s not going to be done in a while, for a while. It is usable already, it’s useful already, but there is so much to do, and especially deploying it in a professional manner where it can really scale to take care as a bonafide payment option for a huge volume business, that sort of stuff. I don’t think a lot of people have really built that yet, and if they have, they might have done it in-house and proprietary, so some of the learnings there are just not completely public yet, or the best practices have not trickled down to the general population yet.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, I think also it’s important to recognize that Lightning – you’re right, and I think a lot of us are frustrated with how far it’s come, but also some of the issues require fairly large rethinks in Bitcoin Core, like package relay. That’s a huge amount of work, and it’s not trivial at all, and it’s taken a while because it’s a huge amount of work, not because people haven’t been working on it. But then I think more generally in Lightning, we’ve seen relatively limited amounts of resources being put on, for example, LND. I think up until their last fundraise, whatever it was, two years ago or something, there were very, very few resources on LND, because Lightning Labs was a startup that had a lot of different projects and had their energy split across a lot of different things. I think who builds Phoenix and Eclair, they’re now maintaining two separate Lightning implementations.

I think broadly, to your point, Lightning has done a good job of demonstrating that you can build this kind of payment channel network and have it work fairly well and have it provide good payment results in common cases. But it’s absolutely the case that we still have a lot of work to do to fix a lot of major issues with it. And I think that’s why you’re seeing right now, all the major Lightning implementations are adding a lot of features all at once, from splicing and dual funding, which helps make it a little simpler to deal with some of these kind of LSP-based wallets, like mobile wallets and whatnot, to BOLT12, which makes the invoice, the QR code static, which is a major UX problem, fixes a ton of issues around privacy, to just redoing, closing, and moving towards, once we get package relay, we can remove the fee negotiation in Lightning, which will resolve a lot of these force closes.

There’s major work being done still to take the protocol from, to your point, what I would call a proof of concept, kind of like, “Look, this works, we can get it to work”, to something that’s really much more stable and much more reliable. There’s still a lot of work to do, but it is a lot of work, and until not very long ago, there weren’t nearly the level of resources that we really needed for that kind of thing, for that kind of work.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, there’s a whole other orthogonal direction with taproot channels that is also starting to get worked on.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, I mean taproot channels aren’t immediately fixing any major issues in Lightning. LND shipped simple taproot channels in their latest release that just came out, or maybe the release candidate that just came out, but it doesn’t really add any features for users or solve any major problems for users as is. It provides a good base for in the future, we want to be able to do multisig channels, so having a channel where you have your local side is actually multiple signers, and I think taproot channels might get us one step towards it. Probably actually the taproot channels as they exist today isn’t sufficient, we probably actually need a slightly different design for it. And then also, of course, taproot channels allows LND to work on their assets feature. But as is, it doesn’t solve any major problems with Lightning, I would say.

Mike Schmidt: I think we can wrap up this item. Next section from the newsletter is selected Q&A from the Bitcoin Stack Exchange. So, this is our monthly segment where we pick some of the top-voted questions and answers since last month, and we have seven of these Q&As that we’re covering this week.

Is there an economic incentive to switch from P2WPKH to P2TR?

The first one is a question that was both asked and answered by our host, Murch, “Is there an economic incentive to switch from P2WPKH to P2TR? Murch, maybe you want to frame the question and what your conclusion was here.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think it’s not a big secret that I’ve been very excited about Taproot for many years. And I’ve seen the argument made in public a few times that, “Well, taproot is more expensive in the round trip because input plus output are bigger than on P2WPKH, so there’s no economic benefit to switching to P2TR”, and I believe that to be false. So, I wrote up in long form a calculation and an overview of how it would get used and why it will end up being cheaper for the user.

To give you the gist of it, so in the round trip, when you create an output, the output is usually created by someone sending funds to you and usually the sender pays for it. So, while that is just externalizing the cost on the sender, senders don’t seem to have a problem sending to P2WSH at the time, so they should also be fine sending to P2TR, which costs the same. And if you’re just looking to minimize your own cost, generally for anything you receive from someone else, you only pay for the input, and the input is significantly cheaper than a P2WPKH input. And if you think about change outputs, unless you absolutely always create single input transactions with a change output to yourself, only in that case, P2WPKH wouldn’t be cheaper for you. Otherwise, you will save money because usually you have more than one input, in average, on transactions, and if you have then the cheaper inputs from P2TR and a slightly more expensive output from P2TR, it’s still going to be cheaper in total than if you go with P2WPKH all throughout.

Anyway, I wrote up the whole thing, I made some tables with calculations. If people are interested in checking my math or thinking about that, I think there is a direct economic incentive of like savings of up to 15% if you switch to P2TR over P2WPKH as a single user. And then for multisig users, it’s just way better.

What is the BIP324 encrypted packet structure?

Mike Schmidt: Next question from the Stack Exchange was, “What is the BIP324 encrypted packet structure. And Pieter Wuille outlines the network packet structure for version 2 P2P transport as proposed in BIP324. And so you can jump into the answer to see the details on that particular structure. BIP324, as a reminder, allows Bitcoin nodes to communicate with each other over encrypted connections. And actually, the project seems to be making some good progress on the repository. What do you think, Murch?

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think you summed that up right. I think it might get ready this release; I’m not 100% sure whether all parts are done. I think the part where it actually starts getting or being able to be used with the network flags and nodes when they see that their peer supports it, actually using the feature, I think that’s the part that is still open. So, it might also just be early in the next release cycle, and it would first be an experimental feature probably anyway. But yeah, it’s getting pretty close to having at least a full implementation of the feature set.

Mike Schmidt: And if you’re curious of the exact progress of BIP324 and what’s in and what’s still being worked on, we linked to the Bitcoin Core #27634 tracking issue for BIP324 and all the associated PRs there in the answer for this week, so take a look at that tracking issue if you’re curious about all that goes into this project.

What is the false positive rate for compact block filters?

Next question is, “What is the false positive rate for compact block filters?” And, Murch, you answered this one by referencing BIP158 on compact block filters, which outlines a false positive rate of 1/784,931. And I think you and Harding had gotten together and figured that that was one extra block every eight weeks if there was a wallet that was monitoring a thousand different output scripts. We also talked with Max Hillebrand last week about some of Wasabi’s interesting work being done around compact block filters for their coinjoin use case. So, if folks are curious about that, check out the discussion we had with Max last week, because there was some interesting discussion that’s relevant to this question. Would you add anything to that, Murch? Okay, thumbs up.

What opcodes are part of the MATT proposal?

Next question from the Stack Exchange, “What opcodes are part of the MATT proposal?” So, the MATT project, which stands for Merkleize All The Things, is an approach to Bitcoin smart contracts that requires some small changes but allows very general smart contract constructions. And the short answer to the actual question, about which opcodes are involved with MATT, is that currently it’s OP_CTV, OP_CHECKCONTRACTVERIFY, and OP_CAT, and we link to some of those opcodes in the answer. But also, if you’re curious about the MATT proposal, Salvatore answered the question and he provided a nice overview of MATT in this answer as well. So, he didn’t actually just answer, “Hey, there’s these three opcodes”, but he kind of gave an overview of MATT, which I think if folks are interested, they should read his answer. I was going to ask Brandon what he thought of MATT, but Brandon needed to drop off, so I guess we’ll have to get his opinion at a separate time.

Is there a well defined last Bitcoin block?

Next question from the Stack Exchange, “Is there a well-defined last Bitcoin block?” And so, Bitcoin uses an unsigned 32-bit value for timestamps, which means there is a max value of what that timestamp value could be. And it turns out that that timestamp is sometime in February of the year 2106, so there wouldn’t be able to be any new blocks after that time without a hard fork. Matt, is this the kind of thing that should be considered with The Great Consensus cleanup or not, because The Great Consensus Cleanup is a soft fork and could the timestamp limitation be overcome via some innovative soft fork, or is this truly a hard fork scenario?

Matt Corallo: There is an old proposal to work around the timestamp issue with a soft fork. It is possible, it’s not ideal, probably not worth it. You have to slow down time, put the timestamp somewhere else, but then you break locktimes, so it’s not worth it. It is theoretically possible, but no, there should be a hard fork for it. Whether it goes in as a part of some other soft fork that does a bunch of other stuff or not, doesn’t really matter. But at some point, someone should write this down, implement it, define it, and then simply write the code, fork it in, you know, a decade or two before we actually reach 2109, whatever the year was you said, and then hopefully by the time that timestamp rolls around, everyone will have upgraded and handles rollover just fine.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I think that it would just be – we have The Great Consensus Cleanup; I thought it was a hard fork, and I think that it is totally possible to do that sort of hard fork that is fairly uncontroversial and just fixes a bunch of protocol issues. And if you just like put activation out ten years in the future or so and carry it around in all the implementations over some time, it should be quite possible to have a homogenous upgrade of the whole network at a fixed time. I don’t think it’s impossible, but somebody would have to implement it and coordinate it, and for this one in specific, we have 100 years almost.

Mike Schmidt: Matt, a philosophical question. With all the angst around soft forks lately, including activation, do you think it would make sense to do something like The Great Consensus Cleanup as a sooner-than-later type initiative to sort of get a fairly non-controversial soft fork out of the way, or what are your thoughts on that?

Matt Corallo: Yeah, that was one of the original reasons for that proposal, but it was also prior to taproot. Between segwit and taproot, there was a dearth of soft forks for quite a long period of time. Now, taproot ended up making faster progress than Great Consensus Cleanup did, and it ended up not making sense to use it as kind of a testbed for modern soft fork activation. I don’t think we really learned anything about activation from the taproot process, it ended up being a bit of a mess, there were a lot of different ideas. So, I mean it might be worth doing again. It’s not something I’m going to spend immediate time on, but some of the changes that were proposed there absolutely do need to happen.

I mean, it cleaned up some quadratic hashing issues, cleaned up a bunch of stuff that really does need to happen at some point. So, it would be good if someone got around to working on that again, but it turns out most engineers working on Bitcoin have lots and lots of ideas that they want to work on, and trying to tell some engineer working on Bitcoin who has 40 of their own ideas to work on some other idea is not really something that ever works.

Why are miners setting the locktime in coinbase transactions?

Mike Schmidt: Next question from the Stack Exchange, “Why are miners setting the locktime in coinbase transactions?” And this was an answer to a question that was open for the last two years about someone noticing that miners are setting coinbase transactions locktime field in order to communicate something, but it was unclear, at least on the stack exchange question, what that was for. And recently a mining pool operator explained that they, “Repurpose those 4 bytes to hold the stratum session data for faster reconnect”. Matt, were you familiar with this usage that some of the mining pools were using those 4 bytes to put stratum session data in there?

Matt Corallo: I was not aware of that, this long, long history of this problem in Bitcoin where miners are doing creative things and no one outside of them is even really aware of it. This has historically been a major issue also from a language barrier. When miners were fairly big in China, there was a much bigger language barrier. Still a problem, less of a problem than it used to be. But, yeah.

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, I actually stumbled over this question a while back and posted it on Twitter. And that’s how we found out that F2Pool at least does this.

Why doesn’t Bitcoin Core use auxiliary randomness when performing Schnorr signatures?

Mike Schmidt: Last question from the Stack Exchange this week is, “Why doesn’t Bitcoin Core use auxiliary randomness when performing Schnorr signatures? So, according to the Schnorr signatures BIP, BIP340 recommends using auxiliary randomness when generating a schnorr signature nonce. And the reason for that is for protection against potential side channel attacks. But Bitcoin Core’s implementation doesn’t use auxiliary randomness, and that was the genesis of this question. I believe it was Andrew Chow who answered, saying, “As with any open-source project, if no one cares enough to implement it, it doesn’t get implemented”. He also goes on to say that, “Providing no auxiliary randomness is still safe as the deterministic nonce-generation algorithm includes the private key. This is enough entropy for it to be safe, so there isn’t any need to provide auxiliary randomness, although it would probably be nice to do so”. Murch, do you have any familiarity with this auxiliary randomness discussion within Bitcoin Core?

Mark Erhardt: No, I’ve learned about it today. I didn’t even see the Stack Exchange question.

Mike Schmidt: Okay. Well, if folks are curious, jump into that Stack Exchange, and there’s actually a link to the commit, which is associated with the lack of randomness. I guess it’s just a vector with a bunch of zeros that’s being used currently. It sounds like from what Andrew was saying, it’s still safe, but it would be nice to also have that randomness added.

Core Lightning 23.08

Next section from the newsletter is Releases and release candidates. We have the Core Lightning 23.08 release. We’ve talked about it a bit, but I’ll summarize some of the highlights here. Support for Codex32-formatted backup and restore; the renepay plugin, which is an experimental plugin for improved pathfinding; experimental support for splicing; and the ability to pay locally generated invoices. And there’s a bunch of other features and bug fixes as well. You can jump into the release notes to check out the details there. And we’ve also had some discussion of these PRs in our previous newsletters, including a discussion with Dusty and Lisa about CLN. So, look for those in the newsletter and our previous podcast discussions. Go ahead, Murch.

Mark Erhardt: Mandatory mention, they now are defaulting to taproot change addresses for their onchain transactions. So, that’s pretty cool.

LND v0.17.0-beta.rc1

Mike Schmidt: Excellent. Next release was to the LND repository, which we referenced earlier. This is the v0.17.0-beta.rc1, and we highlighted one potential piece for testing, which is the simple taproot channels, which is also the last PR for this week, which is LND #7904, which covers simple taproot channels. Murch, did you want to talk simple taproot channels now or when we get to that PR later?

Mark Erhardt: Let’s do it later.

Mike Schmidt: Okay, great. Notable code and documentation changes. We have a Bitcoin Core one, we have a bunch of LDK that hopefully Matt can walk us through, and then that LND Simple taproot channels.

Bitcoin Core #27460

So first one, Bitcoin Core #27460, adding a new importmempool RPC. Murch, what is the motivation for wanting to import a mempool?

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, maybe you run multiple machines to operate a mining pool, for example. So, Bitcoin Core only forwards transactions when it first hears about them. So, if you just bring online a new node in a mining pool cluster, it wouldn’t really have any transactions in their mempool and it would only hear about the new announcements. So, it would perhaps build less efficient or complete block templates for the time being until it’s been online for a while. So, with the export feature that we’ve had for the mempool for a long time, you could now just export the mempool of a running node and import it into this machine, for example, to jumpstart it with a full mempool. I think it might be useful in some testing.

I think it’s most definitely just for power users. I don’t think that a regular node operator that has an intermittent node, or brings online their node after it was offline for a bit, would really care about that. And we do persist the mempool between shutdowns anyway, so if you’re just, I don’t know, shutting it down to upgrade the version and bring it back online, we’ll just have missed a few minutes of the broadcast transactions in between. So, yeah.

Mike Schmidt: Murch, is that use case that you mentioned for mining pools using this RPC, is that something that they communicated that they would like, or is that more something that was theoretically thought could be useful for them, and thus that was the genesis of the PR?

Mark Erhardt: I’m afraid that I’m not aware of any communication with miners there. I just saw the PR, and there are no linked issues either, so I’m not sure what motivated Marco to work on this, but yeah.

LDK #2248

Mike Schmidt: All right, well, we’ll begin our LDK PR marathon here. The first one is #2248. Matt, do you want to walk us through these?

Matt Corallo: Yeah, so like you mentioned in the description, in Lightning, in order to sync the gossip in a DoS-resistant way, the DoS protection for downloading the gossip in Lightning is that every channel announcement points to an onchain UTXO and says, “Hey, this is my UTXO, and here’s a signature proving that between me and my counterparty, this is actually the 2-of-2, and we control this output”. So, certainly LDK has had the ability to verify those forever, but we’ve never actually had sample code that did it. There’s just some code and various other repositories that did that verification.

Now, we added a utility that does that against local Bitcoin Core RPC or REST. So if you have a REST or endpoint from Bitcoin Core or RPC endpoint on Bitcoin Core, you can do this. Of course, you need to increase the RPC command queue in Bitcoin Core, but basically most applications which do material queries to Bitcoin Core have to do that. And in fact, maybe Bitcoin Core should make that default, I don’t know.

LDK #2337

Mike Schmidt: And then the next one for LDK is #2337, making it easier to use LDK for building watchtowers. Maybe talk about that a bit.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, I mean this basically just required exposing a little more details. We already had logic in LDK where you could have hooked this, but it would have been a little gross. Instead, we added some additional details in a different part of the code that allows you to hook basically after we’ve intended to commit to a state update, but before we actually commit to the state update by sending our peer any messages about the update. You can now hook the channel update mechanism to get basically what the counterparty commitment transaction will look like and then later what the revocation secret for that is. And this allows you to integrate with any of the, like I mentioned earlier, the more standard watchtower models, which allow you to enforce stale main balances, unencumbered balances, but if there were any in-flight HTLCs at the time, you won’t manage to enforce that.

LDK has always supported running what’s basically copies of the main enforcement logic on distributed machines, or on many machines, which will allow you to enforce that. The HTLCs in-flight end up resolving correctly, but that scheme does require your private keys on this distributed fleet of machines, whereas a standard launch tower model does not. So there’s trade-offs there, we now support both, which is great, or more formally support both, I guess, which is great, but yeah.

Mike Schmidt: Matt, I had a note here unrelated to these PRs. We covered the release of the LDK node software I think in the last month or so in one of our other segments, and I wanted to just maybe ask you how has reception to that software been? Maybe just provide a quick overview of why you guys released that. Again, unrelated to these PRs, but I figured since we have you, maybe you could plug that.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, totally. We’ve had a great response to it thus far. We’ve had a bunch of people using it to build new wallets that haven’t released yet, or you’re playing around with it, or what have you. So basically, LDK has always been intending to fill a different niche in the Lightning node space than LND, CLN, or Eclair really fill by being much more choose your own adventure. It’s a library, it’s not a daemon. If you want to do something much more custom or integrate with an existing onchain wallet or integrate with an existing chain sync or be more enterprise and run different pieces in your own database backend that you have custom doing some weird multidata center sync, whatever it is, LDK lets you build that.

But building that requires some amount of actually building a thing. So historically, this is materially limited. Developers who still want to use LDK on mobile or for other reasons, but don’t want to go to all the effort to build all of those integrations themselves, a leaky node is more of a default, more opinionated, still a library, but a much simpler library. You just basically import the library, you call the start method, and now you have a Lightning node; you call open channel, and now you have a channel, and now you can send payments, so much less work to do.

There’s also ongoing work on the LSP spec side of things. There’s a number of different teams, no one actually on the LDK team, but a different team at Block, as well as a number of other teams, Breez and a number of other folks working on a spec for how LSP communication should work. And there’s ongoing work to add that logic to LDK by someone from another team at Block, not on the Spiral team, that will allow for a very easy default, where you integrate this LDK node library, you call start, and then you point it at an LSP, and now you’re kind of done, you have a Lightning node, and you can just get an invoice, and it all works with nice LSP integration. But there’s ongoing work to make all of these things easier to standardize all these things, so that there’s just less work for people who want to create a Lightning wallet for some specific purpose.

We really want to enable more people to create Lightning wallets and Lightning integrations so that there’s a lot more competition in that space, because we really think more competition is going to lead to much better UX, much more reliable, just more interesting wallets out there and more interesting integrations that just don’t exist today.

LDK #2411 and #2412

Mike Schmidt: Jumping back to the PRs, the next two were related to LDK’s support for blinded payments. And maybe you can talk a little bit about that, and also sort of separating the code related to blinded payments and onion messages.

Matt Corallo: Yeah. So, this is one of these kind of major projects across the Lightning space right now, is eventually BOLT12, and BOLT12 requires several different pieces. It’s blinded paths as well as onion messages as well as the new offer and invoice formats. So, LDK has landed onion messages and we’ve had support for blinded paths are the ability to give someone a piece of opaque blob that says, “Hey, if you want to talk to me or send a payment to me, you have to first talk to Mark, and then here’s some data that if you give Mark, Mark will know where to relay it to get it to me”.

It’s very similar to how Tor Onion services work, where there’s an introduction point, the client connecting to the Onion service is going to connect to the introduction point, but then only the introduction point knows how to get further onwards to the actual host that’s hosting the data. Blinded paths work in the exact same way. Again, as you point out, LDK has had code for blinded paths for messages, for onion messages, so that you can send messages with recipient privacy, but we have not had it for payments, which is the same basic cryptographic primitives, but has additional steps to deal with fees and all that kind of other good stuff.

So, we’re working on adding that to our payment flows. We have a number of PRs, as you highlight, some of them have already landed, others hopefully will land in the next week or two. And we hope to get blinded payment support as well as full BOLT12 support in, well, not very long, a month, maybe, but these things have a tendency to get delayed sometimes.

Mike Schmidt: Yeah, we know the open PR from Val, #2413, for route blinding, which depended on a couple of these PRs that we highlighted this week. Is there a reason for the flurry of LDK activity this week?

Matt Corallo: I think what you’re really seeing is you’re seeing a lot of stuff finish all at once. There’s just been a lot of long-term projects that have been making slow progress across the project, and then there’s a bunch of stuff that intends to get done all at once. So, we’re trying to land – a big thing for the project has been this broad async support theme, where folks want to have modern async programming with async await in Rust, but also has become kind of a default way of programming for Python and JavaScript and all kinds of other languages. And LDK has had some support for it, but relatively weak support for it, and we’re retooling a lot of our state machine just to make the storage layer have first-class async support.

So, that stuff’s trying to finish up in the next few weeks, but that’s been a six-month project. BOLT12 has been a six-month project, and a bunch of stuff is finishing up this month. So, yeah, we’ve just seen a lot of stuff kind of fall over all at the same time, or get finished up all at the same time. In addition to, we’ve had a number of external contributors start working on LDK. So, the support for watchtowers that we talked about was actually a summer Bitcoin intern. We’ve had some support for better signing, external signing devices that’s being worked on by some folks at Lightspark, and we had some of this work for the LSP spec being worked on again by a different division at Block, not from Spiral, but who is trying to run an LSP. So we’ve had a number of different external contributors start contributing more materially in the last month or two, which has also led to a number of additional PRs.

LDK #2507

Mike Schmidt: Next PR to LDK was #2507, adding a workaround for a long-standing issue in another implementation that leads to unnecessary channel force closures. Dave was diplomatic in his not naming of the implementation!

Matt Corallo: Are we allowed to mention the implementation?

Mike Schmidt: Yeah, go for it, maybe talk a little bit about that, Matt.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, so the other implementation was LND. LND wrote a good chunk of their code before there was a Lightning spec, and part of their channel closure logic, where you try to negotiate the current closing transaction in a way that doesn’t result in doing this force close that locks your money up for two weeks, was written before there was, in fact, the Lightning spec. And the PRs to get it up to actually supporting the Lightning spec, it turns out there were some issues in the way the Lightning spec was phrased for the co-op closing stuff. Another issue, actually, one of those issues we found LDK had an issue with not too long ago, even between two LDK nodes.

So, Eugene, who was at Lightning Labs at the time, I guess he’s still part-time there, a number of months ago, maybe a year ago now, worked on improving the BOLT spec. And then there were some PRs to actually implement the modern co-op close logic in LND, and those never actually made it over the line. And so, this is actually a PR on LDK to work around the LND, those things never making it over the line, and we just kind of do something vaguely brain dead. But basically LND gets mad about a message and we just repeat the message until morale improves. And eventually, LND will accept our message.

But yeah, so the state of co-op closing, Lightning is still a little wonky and the theory negotiation very often fails, even when we don’t hit this bug. So, we’re hoping for rewrite number three or two of the co-op close logic on the Lightning spec that Rusty opened not very long ago. I don’t think anyone’s implemented it yet, but we’re hoping that everyone implements that. And then finally co-op close and Lightning will be at least kind of sort of reliable. But these days, there are many reasons that lead to force closes during co-op close all the time.

LDK #2478

Mike Schmidt: Next LDK PR is #2478, and the genesis of this was an issue that was open that says, “It would be useful to provide the HTLCs that settle the payment via the payment claimed event, both from a logging and an auditing standpoint”. Matt, maybe you could talk a little bit about what that means and why that’s useful.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, so this is one of the folks I mentioned from Lightspark, who they’ve been playing with. They’re running LND for their kind of “main nodes” that they use for custodial services, but they’ve been playing with LDK for some more custom integrations they want to do that’s not fully custodial. And here they wanted a little more details on – they try to do careful external accounting of the Lightning node that they don’t rely on what’s in the Lightning node, they rely on just pulling data out of it and then doing their own accounting against it. And they just wanted a little bit more information when a payment has been claimed, so when you received a payment. Oh, is this forwarding? Oh, this was payment claiming, so this was when you receive a payment; a little more information about just which HTLCs, where they came from, which channels they came in on and kind of that good stuff so that you could see basically which channels were being used, for how much, and exactly what those HTLCs looked like, so that they could line them up with those HTLCs when they were pending.

LND #7904

Mike Schmidt: Last PR for this week was to LND, LND #7904, adding experimental support for simple taproot channels. This is related to the LND 0.17.0-beta.rc1 that we covered earlier. Murch, you mentioned you recorded a recent podcast related to this topic. Do you want to talk about that?

Mark Erhardt: Yeah, actually it’s been two months now, almost. It was around the LN Summit. We had Elle and Oliver Gugger here in the Chaincode office and recorded a Chaincode Labs podcast with them. So, that’s really a comprehensive coverage of the topic of simple taproot channels, if you want to dive more into the topic. From what I remember, the general gist is that they use a funding output that is taproot-based, of course, and that allows them to look like a single-sig spend on co-operative closes, which slightly reduces the cost and improves the privacy for co-operative closes.

The other changes are that some of the commitment transaction expressions move into tapleaves, so script leaves in the script tree of the taproot output. So, if you have a unilateral close, you get slightly smaller outputs and you leak a little less information. But yeah, there’s a bunch of details that had to be considered. For the time being, I think they are also sticking to HTLCs, which makes it easy to forward because you also only really can use Point Time Locked Contracts (PTLCs) if all hops along a route support PTLCs. So, that makes sense to leave that for the future. Yeah, and I don’t know much more about this PR specifically, maybe Matt knows more.

Matt Corallo: Yeah, I mean like you mentioned, it’s kind of setting up stuff for the future. I guess I don’t know a good chunk about the protocol, I haven’t looked at the LND-specific code logic for it. But it’s really setting up the taproot channel so that in the future, we can do PTLCs, and in the future, Lightning Labs can do their taproot assets now. So, this is only currently for private channels; you need a change to the gossip to be able to make these channels public and route wired HTLCs for other people. But it’s a nice feature as is and especially for private channels, it allows it to just look like a standard P2TR output and not a pay-to-multisig output, a 2-of-2 multisig, which means that you do get a little better privacy as a Lightning node, as long as you never force close, as long as you only ever co-op close, which like we mentioned, is still something that needs a lot of improvement in Lightning.

But it would get you a little better privacy, which is pretty nice by itself. But that’s the only kind of immediate change for this. In the long term, it will tee things up to have many more features, though.

Mark Erhardt: Right, so if you have a public channel, you would announce it on the network anyway, and you tell people what the funding output is. So, you don’t really gain a lot of privacy there against an observer that gets Lightning gossip. But for a hidden channel, or unannounced channel, I think is the term of art now, that gives a little bit of a privacy boost.

Matt Corallo: Yeah.

Mike Schmidt: Murch, anything to announce before we wrap up?

Mark Erhardt: Well, next week is TABConf, so if you’re in town, we will have a Builder Day desk from, well, it’s really, achow and I will be talking about Bitcoin Core stuff, but if you have questions about Stack Exchange or Optech or whatever, we can also maybe talk about that. So, maybe see some people there at TABConf.

Mike Schmidt: Well, thanks for you all joining us this week and thanks to our special guests, Matt Corallo, Brandon Black, Greg Sanders, James O’Beirne, and always to my co-host, Murch, and we’ll see you all next week. Cheers.

Mark Erhardt: Great episode. See you.