This week’s newsletter links to a proposal to encrypt P2P communication and describes Lightning Loop, a tool and service for withdrawing bitcoins from an LN channel to an onchain transaction. Also included are links to resources about bech32 adoption, summaries of popular questions and answers from Bitcoin StackExchange, and a list of notable code changes in popular Bitcoin infrastructure projects.
- ● Help test Bitcoin Core 0.18.0 RC2: The second Release Candidate (RC) for the next major version of Bitcoin Core has been released. Testing is still needed by organizations and experienced users who plan to run the new version of Bitcoin Core in production. Use this issue for reporting feedback.
● Version 2 P2P transport proposal: Jonas Schnelli sent a proposed BIP to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list that specifies an algorithm to be used to encrypt traffic between peers. It also specifies some other minor changes to the creation of protocol messages, such as allowing peers to use bandwidth-saving short identifiers and eliminating the SHA256-based checksum on messages, as the AEAD-based encryption scheme protects data integrity. The proposal is meant to replace BIP151 and it contains links to an example implementation for Bitcoin Core and some benchmarks. See Newsletter #10 for previous discussion about P2P protocol encryption.
● Loop announced: Lightning Labs announced a new tool and service to facilitate submarine swaps, HTLC-based atomic swaps of offchain bitcoins for onchain bitcoins. In essence, Alice sends Bob an LN payment secured by a secret she knows, preventing Bob from claiming it. Bob then creates an onchain payment that Alice can spend by revealing the secret. Alice waits for the payment to receive a suitable number of confirmations and then spends it onchain to any address she chooses—revealing the secret in the process. Bob sees Alice’s onchain transaction and uses its revealed secret to claim the LN payment Alice sent him earlier. If Alice doesn’t reveal the secret, the onchain payment contains a refund condition that allows Bob to spend it back to himself after a timelock expires.
Most of the process is trustless, so neither party has an opportunity to steal from the other (provided the software operates (and is operated) correctly). The exception is the creation of the initial onchain transaction and the possible need for Bob to create a refund transaction: if the trustless exchange doesn’t happen, Bob will receive no compensation for the onchain transaction fees required for both of those transactions. According to the Loop documentation, their implementation has Alice send Bob a small trusted payment via LN in advance of the trustless exchange as an act of good faith and an assurance that the operation won’t end up costing Bob money.
By allowing Alice and Bob to swap onchain and offchain funds, all while continuing to use their existing channels, Loop helps users keep their channels open longer and makes it conceivable that they could stay open indefinitely.
● Square Crypto developer group announced: the CEO of Square announced on Twitter that they are forming a group to employ several contributors to open source Bitcoin projects, including both developers and a designer. See their announcement for application instructions. (Note: Square is also a sponsoring member of Optech.)
Bech32 sending support
Week 2 of 24. From now until the second anniversary of the segwit soft fork lock-in on 24 August 2019, the Optech Newsletter will contain this weekly section that provides information to help developers and organizations implement bech32 sending support—the ability to pay native segwit addresses. This doesn’t require implementing segwit yourself, but it does allow the people you pay to access all of segwit’s multiple benefits.
As described last week, implementing just segwit spending should be easy. Yet we suspect some managers might wonder whether there are enough people using segwit to justify their team spending development effort on it. This week, we look at sites that track various segwit adoption statistics so that you can decide whether it’s popular enough that your wallet or service might become an outlier by failing to support it soon.
Optech tracks statistics about segwit use on our dashboard; another site tracking related statistics is P2SH.info. We see an average of about 200 outputs per block are sent to native segwit addresses (bech32). Those outputs are then spent in about 10% of all Bitcoin transactions. That makes payments involving native segwit addresses more popular than almost all altcoins.
However, many wallets want to use segwit but still need to deal with services that don’t yet have bech32 sending support. These wallets can generate a P2SH address that references their segwit details, which is less efficient than using bech32 but more efficient than not using segwit at all. Because these are normal P2SH addresses, we can’t tell just by looking at transaction outputs which P2SH addresses are pre-segwit P2SH outputs and which contain a nested segwit commitment, and so we don’t know the actual number of payments to nested-segwit addresses. However, when one of these outputs is spent, the spender reveals whether the output was segwit. The above statistics sites report that currently about 37% of transactions contain at least one spend from a nested-segwit output. That corresponds to about 1,400 outputs per block on average.
Any wallet that supports P2SH nested segwit addresses also likely supports bech32 native addresses, so the number of transactions made by wallets that want to take advantage of bech32 sending support is currently over 45% and rising.
To further gauge segwit popularity, you might also want to know which notable Bitcoin wallets and services support it. For that, we recommend the community-maintained bech32 adoption page on the Bitcoin Wiki or the when segwit page maintained by BRD wallet.
The statistics and compatibility data show that segwit is already well supported and frequently used, but that there are a few notable holdouts that haven’t yet provided support. It’s our hope that our campaign and other community efforts will help convince the stragglers to catch up on bech32 sending support so that all wallets that want to take advantage of native segwit can do so in the next few months.
Selected Q&A from Bitcoin StackExchange
Bitcoin StackExchange is one of the first places Optech contributors look for answers to their questions—or when we have a few spare moments of time to help curious or confused users. In this monthly feature, we highlight some of the top voted questions and answers made since our last update.
Multiple questions about LN transport security: Rene Pickhardt asked several questions about the encryption used to communicate LN messages, such as why is message length encrypted? and what’s special about ChaCha20-Poly1305?. The answers to these questions may be especially interesting in the context of the proposed BIP for a Bitcoin P2P encrypted transport protocol, which is planned to use the same cipher.
Multiple questions about Schnorr-based signatures: Pickhard also asked several question about BIP-Schnorr, Taproot, and the plans to make those features available to Bitcoin transactions. See will Schnorr allow a single signature per block? and does MuSig have the same security as current Bitcoin multisig?.
● How were the parameters for the secp256k1 curve chosen? This is the elliptical curve used in Bitcoin. Some curve parameters play an important role in security, so it’s useful to know whether those parameters were chosen wisely. Other parameters don’t matter much for security, but their history might be interesting anyway. In his answer, Gregory Maxwell provides the history he’s learned so far, an explanation of why the still-open questions don’t affect security, and why we might never learn any more about the origin of certain curve parameters.
● What addresses should I support when developing a wallet? A developer asks whether he should support both P2PKH (
1foo...) addresses and P2SH-wrapped segwit (
3bar...) addresses, or whether it’s safe to just provide the P2SH address. Andrew Chow answers that just the P2SH address is enough. Gregory Maxwell extends this by saying that, if developer did decide to display two addresses, a better combination would be the P2SH-wrapped segwit address and a native segwit (bech32) address (
Notable code and documentation changes
● Bitcoin Core #10973 makes Bitcoin Core’s built-in wallet component access information about the block chain through a well-defined interface rather than directly accessing functions and variables on the node component. There are no user-visible changes associated with this update, but the merge is notable because it’s the last of a set of foundational refactorings that should make it easy for future changes to run the node and the wallet/GUI in separate processes (see Bitcoin Core #10102 for one approach to this), as well as improving the modularity of the Bitcoin Core codebase and allowing more focused component testing. Besides laying the groundwork for major changes to come, this PR is notable for being open for over a year and a half, receiving almost 200 code-review comments and replies, and requiring over 150 updates and rebases. Optech thanks the PR author, Russell Yanofsky, for his amazing dedication in seeing this PR through to merge.
● Bitcoin Core #15617 omits sending
addrmessages containing the IP addresses of peers the node currently has on its ban-list. This prevents your node from telling other nodes about peers it found to be abusive.
● Bitcoin Core #13541 modifies the
sendrawtransactionRPC to replace the
allowhighfeesparameter with a
maxfeerateparameter. The earlier parameter, if set to true, would send the transaction even if the total fee exceeded the amount set by the
maxtxfeeconfiguration option (default: 0.1 BTC). The new parameter takes a feerate and will reject the transaction if its feerate is above the provided value (regardless of the setting for
maxtxfee). If no value is provided, it’ll only send the transaction if its fee is below the
● LND #2765 changes how the LN node responds to channel breaches (attempted theft). Previously, if an attempted breach was detected, the node created a breach remedy transaction to collect all funds associated with that channel. However, when users start using watchtowers, the watchtower may create a breach remedy transaction but not include all the possible funds. (This doesn’t mean the watchtower is malicious: your node may simply not have had a chance to tell the watchtower about the latest commitments it accepted.) This PR updates the logic used to generate the breach remedy transaction so that it only collects the funds that haven’t been collected by prior breach remedy transactions, allowing recovery of any funds the watchtower didn’t collect.
● LND #2691 increases the default address look-ahead value during recovery from 250 to 2,500. This is the number of keys derived from an HD seed that the wallet uses when rescanning the block chain for your funds. Previously, if your node gave out more than 250 addresses or pubkeys without any of them being used, your node would not find your complete balance on its first rescan, requiring you to initiate additional attempts. Now, you’d need to give out more than 2,500 addresses before reiteration might become necessary. An earlier version of this PR wanted to set this value to 25,000, but there were concerns that this would significantly slow down rescanning with the BIP158 Neutrino implementation, so the value was decreased until it could be shown that people needed a value that high. (Note: checking addresses against a BIP158 filter is very fast by itself; the problem is that any match requires downloading and scanning the associated block—even if it’s a false-positive match. The more addresses you check, the greater the number of expected false positives, so scanning becomes slower and requires more bandwidth.)